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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
    
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(No. 2:18-cv-05064) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 29, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.  
 











 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Dorothea Sudler appeals an order of the District Court affirming the decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that denied her applications for disability insurance 
benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental social security income (“SSI”).  For the reasons set 
forth herein, we will affirm. 
I 
 Sudler suffers from persistent lower back pain, and in 2014 applied for DIB and 
SSI benefits.  The medical reports regarding Sudler’s back pain and her relative physical 
abilities indicate that:  (1) throughout 2014, Sudler had “normal gait,” “normal range of 
motion,” “no edema,” and “no tenderness,” AR 328, 345; and her lumbar spine x-rays 
were described as “unremarkable,” AR 350; (2) in 2015, an MRI showed only “minimal” 
and “unchanged” irregularities, AR 562, and her physician observed that she had a 
normal gait, experienced “no acute distress” under physical examination, was able to 
“walk on [her] heels and toes without much difficulty,” could “squat 70% full,” and did 
not need an assistance device for ambulation, AR 459; (3) in 2016, Sudler underwent 
“medial branch nerve diagnostic” and steroid injections, AR 502; and (4) in 2017, Sudler 
was provided with “mindfulness resources” and was referred for a “pain psychology 
consultation,” AR 525.  During these periods, Sudler was prescribed medication for her 
pain, but she testified that while it made her “comfortable,” it also made her “sleepy,” 
“sick,” and “like . . . a zombie.”  AR 53-54.  Physicians also repeatedly encouraged 
Sudler to participate in regular physical therapy, but she did not consistently do so.  
Regarding Sudler’s specific physical limitations, one physician in 2014 opined that 
Sudler could not lift, pull, push, or carry greater than twenty-five pounds.  Another 
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physician in 2015 reported that Sudler could occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds 
and could frequently use her hands to reach, handle, and push/pull.  The same physician, 
however, reported that Sudler appeared to be in no acute distress and had a good 
prognosis.1  
 In addition to the medical evidence, the ALJ considered the testimony of a 
vocational expert.  The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical claimant with 
Sudler’s limitations2 would not be able to physically perform Sudler’s previous work but 
could perform other light, unskilled jobs.  The expert then identified specific jobs in the 
national economy potentially available to an individual with physical limitations like 
those of Sudler.   
The ALJ considered the evidence and applied the five-step sequential evaluation 
process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920,3 and determined that (1) 
Sudler had not engaged in substantial gainful activity or employment since 2016; (2) 
 
1 Sudler described her daily activities as remaining at home, except to visit the 
doctor and her mother, and further testified that her husband does the cleaning and 
shopping.  The ALJ declined the offer to hear Sudler’s husband’s testimony about her 
activities at home because the ALJ accepted her testimony on that subject.   
2 The limitations the ALJ posed to the vocational expert involved whether a 
claimant of Sudler’s age, education, and past work experience could perform a range of 
light work with occasional stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and climbing ramps 
and stairs, but no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and with no exposure to extreme cold, 
wetness, or vibration.   
3 Under this five-step process, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant (1) is 
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a “severe” medical impairment; (3) has an 
impairment that would render her per se disabled under the listings; (4) retains “residual 
functional capability” to perform past work; and (5) can perform any other work 
considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.  20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 
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Sudler suffered from lumbosacral degenerative disc disease; (3) the impairment did not 
meet Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine) as set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 
Appendix 1, because neither her nerve root nor her spinal cord were compromised; (4) 
Sudler’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allowed her to perform light work, subject 
to certain postural and environmental limitations,4 because her condition was mild, she 
was not participating in physical therapy, she did not require back surgery, and she could 
move effectively without a hand-held assistance device; and (5) although she could not 
perform her past relevant work as a janitor, housecleaner, or housekeeping dayworker, 
based on the vocational expert’s testimony, Sudler could perform other jobs available in 
the national economy.  On this basis, the ALJ found that Sudler was “not disabled.”  AR 
36.  Sudler appeals.   
II5 
 We exercise plenary review over an ALJ’s determination of legal issues, Chandler 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011), and review the factual 
findings and final determination under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).  
The substantial evidence threshold is not high, Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 
(2019), and includes “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
 
4 Specifically, the ALJ found that Sudler could perform light work “except 
occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, 
ropes, and scaffolds; and no exposure to extreme cold, wetness, or vibration.”  AR 29. 
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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adequate to support a conclusion.”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “It is more than a mere scintilla 
but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  If, upon review of the record as a whole, Schaudeck, 181 
F.3d at 431, we determine that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 
we are bound by those findings even if we would have decided the case differently, 
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III 
 The ALJ found that Sudler’s back pain constituted a severe impairment that 
limited her RFC to performing light work,6 subject to certain restrictions.  A claimant’s 
RFC is the most work he or she can still do despite the relevant physical and mental 
limitations.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).7  A claimant’s RFC should adequately reflect 
his or her “credibly established limitations,” especially when later used as the basis for a 
vocational expert hypothetical.  Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
omitted).   
 
6 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.  Even though the weight lifted 
may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or 
standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of 
arm or leg controls.  To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light 
work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.  If someone can 
do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are 
additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods 
of time.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 




Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.  The ALJ described 
Sudler’s RFC as follows:  “claimant [can] perform light work . . . except occasionally 
stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or 
scaffolds; and no exposure to extreme cold, wetness, or vibration.”  AR 29.  The evidence 
shows that Sudler had “normal gait,” “[n]ormal range of motion,” “no edema,” and “no 
tenderness,” AR 328, 345; her x-rays were “unremarkable,” AR 350; and her MRIs 
displayed only minimal irregularities.  Moreover, one medical report noted that Sudler 
demonstrated “[i]nconsistent and non-anatomical sensory deficits” and “[o]verreaction 
during testing.”  AR 491. 
The ALJ also considered Sudler’s testimony about her pain.  An ALJ must 
carefully consider a claimant’s statements about her symptoms, SSR 16-3p; Reefer v. 
Barnhart, 326 F.3d. 376, 381 (3d Cir. 2003), but “the ALJ is not required to credit them.”  
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 363 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)).  Substantial evidence 
supports the ALJ’s finding that Sudler’s “impairment could reasonably [have been] 
expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms [but that her] statements concerning the 
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely 
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .”  AR 30.  For 
instance, despite her complaints of constant back pain, Sudler underwent relatively 
routine and conservative treatment, such as injections, and pain psychology management, 
but she was not taking medication of any kind (including over-the-counter medication) to 
address her pain as of the date of the hearing, and she did not complete physical therapy.  
See Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 
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1995) (“[A] patient’s failure consistently to use prescribed pain medication may 
undermine the patient’s claims of debilitating pain . . . .” (citation omitted)); Welch v. 
Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that claimant’s decision to cease taking 
pain medication that made him feel “tired and depressed” indicated that while his “pain 
may be constant and uncomfortable, it is not disabling or severe”).  Thus, Sudler’s 
modest treatment plan and her failure to comply with recommended pain management 
techniques provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s decision to not fully credit Sudler’s 
testimony about the extent of her pain. 
Even crediting Sudler’s back pain complaint, substantial evidence supports the 
ALJ’s determination that Sudler’s RFC allowed her to perform light work.8  Among other 
things, Sudler’s treating physicians assigned no significant long-term limitations due to 
her back pain.  In addition, the ALJ had a basis to reject the limitations certain doctors 
placed on Sudler’s capacity to lift.  For instance, one report dates back to 2010, many 
years before the alleged 2016 onset date.  Another report stating Sudler could lift no more 
than ten pounds also stated that Sudler did not appear to have “acute distress,” needed no 
“assistive devices” or help getting on the examination table, and had a good prognosis—
descriptions that are inconsistent with a ten-pound limitation.9 
 
8 Sudler contends that given her status as “closely approaching advanced age,” 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), she would be disabled under the Medical Vocational Guidelines 
Grid if she was only able to perform sedentary work rather than light work.  This 
argument is immaterial, however, because the ALJ’s determination that Sudler could 
perform light work was supported by substantial evidence. 
9 Additionally, the fact that Sudler has received pain treatment is not dispositive on 
the question of disability.  Rather, a claimant may suffer from serious pain without being 
“disabled” under the Social Security Act if she is still able to work.   
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Because the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by the evidence, we next 
examine whether there is substantial evidence to show that Sudler’s RFC did not preclude 
her from working.  On this point, the vocational expert testified about jobs available for a 
hypothetical person with Sudler’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and other 
credibly established limitations.10  See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (citation omitted).  
The vocational expert testified that there were jobs available for a hypothetical person 
with Sudler’s limitations.  Based upon this testimony, the ALJ properly found that Sudler 
could work and thus was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 
The ALJ’s decision was well-reasoned and thoroughly discussed the medical 
evidence, the vocational expert’s testimony, and Sudler’s testimony about her pain, her 
daily activities, and her ability to work.  The ALJ also explained why she found Sudler 
overstated her complaints, given her decision to forego even over-the-counter pain 
medication and her refusal to regularly attend physical therapy.  The ALJ also explained 
why she gave certain medical reports little weight.  See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362 (noting 
that to ensure meaningful review an ALJ must explain “the weight given to physician 
opinions and the degree to which a claimant’s testimony is credited” (citations omitted)); 
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A]n examiner’s findings should be 
as comprehensive and analytical as feasible . . . so that a reviewing court may know the 
basis for the decision.” (citation omitted)).  Thus, the ALJ fully explained the basis for 
 
10 The ALJ’s proposed hypothetical did not mention Sudler’s testimony that her 
pain medication made her sleepy and like a “zombie.”  This fact was irrelevant, however, 
because Sudler stopped taking the medication and declined to pursue other treatment, 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
11 Sudler relies on Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981) and Dobrowolsky 
v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979), to argue that the ALJ’s decision was not well-
reasoned.  These cases, however, are distinguishable.  The ALJs in both cases ignored 
certain evidence and failed to explain why they rejected or discounted other evidence.  
Here, the ALJ explicitly grappled with hundreds of pages of medical records spanning 
nearly a decade and provided reasons for why the evidence led to her conclusion. 
